Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6dd676925d3d82d9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

18.1 KB
MD5: 1239fd0448f8453cb43316003d74f00e SHA-1: b84f8b6fe4b390cabd91986857fc830e5bbaf829 SHA-256: 6dd676925d3d82d9a9c35be234d4d3b4ad0fa0736144ca220599d5106ace8c37
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, which is typically used to download and run a second-stage payload. No document body or script content was available for further analysis, but the exploit itself is a strong indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000e91.bin
b935e03bc23c6470f936088f4243ee07d8866caaef94994771dadf7583e2a224		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE91 2003 bytes

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