Win.Trojan.Pejuang-1 — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6dbe4d9579655db8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

52.5 KB Created: 1997-03-19 13:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 498a180fcfd4c311b1010f3a1aa5b39a SHA-1: 1ed09aa83fdb7a808c7b3ed31e2576b45289cbc0 SHA-256: 6dbe4d9579655db8096f0b0894f804534ba2d999213305f0bd29a68cbd608194
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Trojan.Pejuang-1 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains legacy WordBasic macro code, identified by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Pejuang-1. The macro includes commands to format the C drive and displays political messages related to 'PEJUANG DEMOKRASI' and boycotting elections. This suggests a destructive or disruptive intent masked by political messaging.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Pejuang-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Pejuang-1
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 49,962 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 49,962 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00000ed6.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0xED6 49962 bytes
SHA-256: 17f345bc9fb9593ec311cde290bcea0c2409c6be2c7b8941ab5e6268287f7e16
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Pejuang-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.