Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6daee039554a6e5a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.53 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-12
MD5: 522ce2bbbd8f6e8790f331810aeb96a5 SHA-1: 5b70de8b6d08db35b1bf062ac45b94d97c0b2bb5 SHA-256: 6daee039554a6e5a7f2beddc8bf63ed10b7bd6017a1d827c63074f72c4adc822
312 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution

The file is an Excel spreadsheet containing an embedded Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload that includes a direct link to a URL. The PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques and attempts to deliver a payload directly.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDI) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDI)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
b90cbee54a3c9d7194d4f8e854f409914e72ae805b37e7d987eb2106ef6cd08b		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD001251A6/OLE10naTIVE 1444 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
7e896c777017e45a6e6d9bb2c4fff1462dd28d33e633f458f41cb31aa33171a6		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1597952 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
a1a36ac7378f7b896bf668110fd5d16f9be010202540b8d46cb279a40353a057		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1576960 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e600.pdf
80243574c9241def8bad536a0bd0974d0619732181d1325833989ee671758b54		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE600 1543168 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002d000.pdf
634d84c4fe81fe2ec221e0a90e9ac74e39374905ee40a89f3eefe0d0fcffa119		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x2D000 1417728 bytes

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