Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6daa7fcb23eded52…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

341.5 KB
MD5: 45572178eebec386537daa567e33a702 SHA-1: 64a29a527d9dc1067ddb8a2fb4155cf04bf3ff08 SHA-256: 6daa7fcb23eded522fb8376fa8863775c985711a309d183e625ad63a784a9735
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this object, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000056.bin
a5c84605db0e2ca4fa5615aaad3571f4633bc2afb73de82e4fe028bf49b0522b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x56 110908 bytes