Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6da7efe30418e524…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.76 MB
MD5: a41528f5611e64e1c89f7ee2e7978b19 SHA-1: 5c0bda023b72d5b2dfb80bc2f7be2e443ec4d8b7 SHA-256: 6da7efe30418e5242fe5521fa3d00e6bbaad58d95e21128d4c4630ffce8f41a1
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the presence of a CVE-2017-11882 exploit targeting Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely a second-stage payload, upon opening the document. The large amount of hex-encoded data within OLE objects further suggests the embedding of a malicious binary.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1849KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000098.bin
aab3f61fddcfc1da79bde2512e5897ee27e23a84002b4914983204c0054bc6a8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x98 924704 bytes