Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6da53111f05cc2b2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.5 KB
MD5: 1babd8a69283c4acccf521d0e4299fcf SHA-1: 8a8e7c773bb047f3da48780c6395a9ccf2b07c7e SHA-256: 6da53111f05cc2b2587531366fde87681436b3b56e9e80371e5f173880d1226f
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF file that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader, specifically targeting XFA forms. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, which is often used to download and run additional malicious payloads. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the embedded file heuristic further supports the presence of a secondary stage.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream low PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
95b786cee6334d2f2cbc45d19a270bbf39b1b14d54711b32436ad03d30b6ec34		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101133 bytes

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