Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6d9ae139a4bc6396…

MALICIOUS

RTF

435.4 KB Created: 2018-03-20 13:16:00 First seen: 2018-04-12
MD5: c17b070d89b7a0e7da1e2a09012637c0 SHA-1: 2be662250d32be8a08b7317f95caf6e10e48df16 SHA-256: 6d9ae139a4bc63965b81297b610e2250f2b89c31569473ecba2b898fb52249a3
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains critical heuristics indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759, which are known vulnerabilities used to execute embedded OLE objects. The embedded object likely serves as a dropper for a second-stage payload, as evidenced by the embedded URL pointing to a MSI file. The document body is minimal and does not provide further context on the lure.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://geminianimultimarcas.com/bezoai.msi In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000a2b6.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA2B6 15672 bytes
SHA-256: 3f170159125da1bdcf8fe45db1505a27b5bc1952e02d70d22ea5ebd07ae30ec2

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.