Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 6d6f5c2de3fb7cbf

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

4.23 MB Created: 2021-05-05 09:43:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: 48c99304e58a0c27a0945f6fd6a6c47c SHA-1: 8d95dd213bbebabf1a6eb64f96cedbe20885d5fd SHA-256: 6d6f5c2de3fb7cbf95e61599c0e5937e9c0ef824cd43025b7d74204104e6e420

350 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro that is automatically executed upon opening (Auto_Open). This macro uses obfuscated calls to WMI (Win32_Process.Create) to execute 'msiexec.exe' with arguments to install a downloaded MSI payload. The macro reconstructs the path to the dropped MSI as '%LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\wct2CEBA.msi', which is then executed. The use of WMI for process creation and the obfuscation of API names indicate a malicious intent to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 10

VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE

VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION

VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Trojan_Macro_RESUMEPLEASE_1-9805027-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Trojan.Trojan_Macro_RESUMEPLEASE_1-9805027-0
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ

GetObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC

Reference to VirtualAlloc API
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON

Environ() call (env variable access)
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `23739596b26c67ac65d4c1a06abccad5c4615a4a6c9c71db434ba0f8760dae9e`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	3318 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.