Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6d663f0eb63ea5f6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.2 KB Created: 2020-08-31 13:21:24 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 94081ec51ded9ae55c238895f93400c4 SHA-1: 2f61fe93ef048e2330345ef9db6a50275b312415 SHA-256: 6d663f0eb63ea5f61d0a3063c2cb99fdebbbc96b105db9cf06257bac8f8e237a
234 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=douleurs+apr%25C3%25A8s+coloscopie In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b47706_7190ad8ebea145de8396cc10b18ec223.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/77eba6_2b8f6a8ca14b4761ab3b0db6eb040f62.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/7ff653_ab4f8a3baab043dfb4032c5e12c23b7e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/93c935_fbcfde18b1014b128b2d051c42e18444.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/8118/8003/files/mozomew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2219/5608/files/23941548752.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8173/5073/files/mokupovepu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/8711/6965/files/nogela.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1008/8357/files/zoguxowasowuge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2553/8973/files/90279413147.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/1309/3029/files/rxprep_course_book_2017.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0463/0370/7298/files/masozex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/1048/0533/files/24516557127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/5af86b_1b517865282e4af8a9d047e0ec6655e2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/77eba6_38b3ad62852448348aff877a4b938e8f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_6d73cf8433204135b91e152131b56768.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c245.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC245 5068 bytes
SHA-256: fdb2a6b3fa9c1aea962a2451ca2cfb79ef655aaec2f0ff69fd7687cea64b9639
font_01_sfnt_off0000d34f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD34F 12636 bytes
SHA-256: e582303393e8564fd982b45b5a13945fb1bfbc89056795020ca48efef0cd4e33

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