Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6d52b969aa32c745…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.0 KB Created: 2020-11-18 03:42:26 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 561e460916e0443661629b76d84d0117 SHA-1: 172081f06c3e0c033008a269332a8ab7f875d5eb SHA-256: 6d52b969aa32c7457c514ba94d77e9a81860df91b3e9879c483271d553383a97
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious sites. The presence of the ClamAV detection and ML classifier flagging indicates a high likelihood of malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself is indicative of a malicious lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafftec.ru/123?utm_term=tarot+card+meaning+book+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://nawawuxilebop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134679594/8156338.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mejodulifewu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134526208/00f9f87276.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fimozafovobas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741130/ragurezutekafuw-zuliwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://babikovinemixe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856339/nifit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dijumigomeruke.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134309809/sepus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://devuzagobeli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134431767/25dae4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kutepazibug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134477769/2174905.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://babikovinemixe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856339/5d44e40a7bf30.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vejuvofarazaxar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134355137/xavewibezetezo-kapafen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riragojefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857115/2bb9ac.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ee3f0fab-8036-4eeb-8ccb-ab2649b8835b/balafatewadawoxorifub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/abc8fa54-bfeb-444e-8ff1-4fa18c017f8c/zetiwobofowet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ed47.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED47 5420 bytes
SHA-256: c38062b87e2a6f84a021def1aa08c732f2c436065c69011ea1977ee45d0d155c
font_01_sfnt_off0000ffa0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFFA0 10404 bytes
SHA-256: ceb53b2de34db949bebd96d49c873487ac374e296642e0b2b6171b8809a4aff4