Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6d25daffdd93cb4e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.9 KB Created: 2021-07-07 02:45:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 42fbdbcfefdfc5194865b1b964c140d5 SHA-1: 2b1f28f896a3bf3647e490cc9767f25007f1a691 SHA-256: 6d25daffdd93cb4e60cad0b4ada1a1287c80281e63520828dbc3d6d7fc1e7077
232 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating it is a lure for payment redirection or phishing, including 'SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE' and 'SE_INVOICE_LURE'. It also features a link farm pointing to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting an attempt to obscure the final malicious destination. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and ClamAV detected it as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan'. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9952

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://indobaliart.com/sitefiles/file/13887256865.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.dnevi-sekretarjev.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160adabe90f7d6---17926755561.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kurishupally.org/userfiles/file/73330479787.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.niziointerior.pl/upload/file/fipisezabidipevakavor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--90ad5ackt1d.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c3ea21311018ec307ba4dd6851102ad7/83350612543.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://quaint-house.com/77283754609.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://taborcapitalpayment.com/clients/d/d0/d0a3925ee25d0adc8806453b18bccccc/File/34049950823.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://insidethedigitaltrend.com/userfiles/file/xofikuwigepixugez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://enville.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ae9f2767e0---wawuvopuxola.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alimentosldm.com/userfiles/file/72175369962.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.orarestauratorisaf.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c971cd049c1---8918946789.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://butchercurnow.com/img/shop//contents/40177227873.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kondicionery-lubertsy.ru/upload_picture/file/gulewigitufojazexegetu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aftckwt.com/uploads/file/sarowunekuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sharpeningfactory.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160be40342e55d---88988187379.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ipvoicenj.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a5f1146e56a---53832478414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stratasphere.online/userfiles/file/72045434091.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hcibatiment.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609d5ce8b80ff---35892082900.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hashtag.school/userfiles/file/70862829229.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mwflower.com/upimagesfile///53887788938.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.apsetedavisi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084026a33fc2---96203021051.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://creativesilhouettes.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608f7205085c6---jawubetuzo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://unipell.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a273079944c---99600416170.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=final+reminder+email+for+outstanding+paymentPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ffeb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFFEB 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00011802.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11802 11032 bytes
SHA-256: 0a86d2858a9384a909f82185bdf5ec4dd46c3842833afa1a247b02d8b6a6a4bd
font_02_sfnt_off0001316c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1316C 17812 bytes
SHA-256: 9dd54af209cfc24cec8486fc698805df678724753656ec9d0d39925cf843a5ef

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