Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6d1518fe35a9ef60…

MALICIOUS

PDF

10.0 KB
MD5: 23191d22752681eaa90b25b43c0d3a43 SHA-1: e600e1bee2e896545e1491476e6e722d94f0c672 SHA-256: 6d1518fe35a9ef6046be3b649844e8ebe4e18b3b53d8e5d764e37b43d81cbab6
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains XFA forms with risky executable scripts, indicating an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. While no specific URLs were directly associated with malicious activity, the presence of embedded scripts suggests the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, likely delivered via spearphishing.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • XFA form contains risky executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream low PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://google.com
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0041.bin
c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0xB03 85 bytes
embedded_file_obj0042.bin
dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0xBB5 1029 bytes
embedded_file_obj0121.bin
7939edd1a81f6705cc8335f3e02f61dc9e8727c6ddf81c97bc920715fd7c5be1
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 121 at offset 0xDCF 70647 bytes
embedded_file_obj0044.bin
3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x237A 144 bytes
embedded_file_obj0045.bin
10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x2427 77 bytes