Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6d01d2b7ba43bd9b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

34.0 KB First seen: 2023-10-04
MD5: 130b68050fb2c995533b651154d8b472 SHA-1: 585739e761b92105e2878cccf5dcf10a1cd9437e SHA-256: 6d01d2b7ba43bd9b9d19f875f269e9f0598754a5f6e84713fb5addb31a02a7fa
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. Heuristics indicate that the object is automatically linked and its update is forced, suggesting an attempt to trigger code execution upon opening. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting vulnerabilities to download and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001925.bin
941ee3bc1544f81269a713c1750c9a02d09f9793e0adb5096c610bb1ee47e6d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1925 1454 bytes