RTF malware analysis — malicious · 6d00c4cf9f22e0d2

MALICIOUS

RTF

23.7 KB First seen: 2022-11-16

MD5: cf60dc73f6e4f05a1b68ad29daa1efba SHA-1: 032faa00a1b65be78497517a24f1cc632488b473 SHA-256: 6d00c4cf9f22e0d29648230b906b2ef12ea98c625b43abe58b3426ccaad9a33c

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic confirms the document instructs the user to enable editing, which would trigger the OLE object's activation via \objupdate. This suggests a classic exploit delivery mechanism targeting users who open the document.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000042e8.bin` `86b949d997d440c2f1843eb0e7db4f831fa623911625e878b8831eba69f5fbee`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x42E8	1598 bytes

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