Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6cfd03f513e861b7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

148.2 KB Created: 2021-06-17 07:52:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 2506d22474788c939a11099a192ba2b9 SHA-1: 829c2f32ac090b6c39c6d7cae65e26ed1da9a737 SHA-256: 6cfd03f513e861b729adbb49ef41dd73e20eeb5e2de8c8628239f9f6a210705b
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document employs multiple lures to trick the user into downloading a malicious file. It presents itself as a software update or a document requiring user action, with embedded URLs pointing to compromised websites. The presence of a password lure suggests an attempt to bypass gateway scanning by encrypting the payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ketchas.ru/uplcv?utm_term=ms+office+2007+updates+free+download PDF link annotation
    • https://www.idromeccanicasrl.com/idromeccanicasrl.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a454cccb5d58a8e33c5664c1a1f25b69/fower.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.tenniscanberra.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160849f38b60e9---41325157470.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.etoiles-recrutement.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16078c5d542253---20290505422.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kayakbranson.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c1eff73551d---32083515179.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cibaospalaser.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l17t947rbtgc9fmfoc797gmeea/pedosatomawedewalixajuji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.havanasalsa-dance-tours.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/65d5cd241bbc806406bff879f0e22f10/28716049165.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://finsura-lifedirect.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c4380383e98---25352019530.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.lightingandhvacexpo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/28031684cd5cc6db438ae7e9b2e68c2f/zujajujexib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hoondb.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098321ccc680---xekuzizarujixuvazoxobi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dobryremont.pl/ebobas/portal/app/webroot/img/tmp/file/16220159420536.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://whatproperty.ng/ckfinder/userfiles/files/14031108620.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lea-inc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b5863f64a5d1049d726f6ca8c0a8848c/10865939728.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://edwardlankin.com/clients/86087/File/5895954837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00020750.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x20750 5600 bytes
SHA-256: e04d9a0b568d0209ebf2a04dddf2866f4b91469be48e9db541bb9bdd36d52087
font_01_sfnt_off00021a97.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x21A97 11464 bytes
SHA-256: c03fb62a293dcf38c1ff3bb8ff0d3443a067f178633d1aca5ea132fa6e303295

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.