Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6ccc74e8bc64ebc7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

1.30 MB Created: 2021-06-23 12:53:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 529eec8206dc48650b1d7390c3ffbaf4 SHA-1: eb255cf00a4413a6328f34cdca5c096d270048a8 SHA-256: 6ccc74e8bc64ebc728513fc429d5e1d7a4496db498cbdda63474d98907da4bb5
662 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that executes a second-stage payload. The macro attempts to copy content and then uses ShellExecuteA to run 'rundll32 kikus.dll,OFCBWXTHRNL', indicating it's designed to load and execute a DLL. An embedded PE executable and a DLL file were extracted, and ClamAV detected the sample as 'Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1', suggesting a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 17

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b63fa2303f27e014e38c8c1471933c1dbb661e0d8d57af7ef2b73e4c07a34a03		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2719 bytes
embedded_office_0008fa71.exe
0b2e2d9f74c5e7c44e29511059b2975d551c42e5c3703e70f659881b3fa9b73e		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8FA71 778127 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin
2153c8e2af6e010be717ac6a2c2ae92b9b892ee748de6d4ec30963c8e2d18d38		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1685933105/Ole10Native 738613 bytes

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