RTF malware analysis — malicious · 6cc0b2aa248eca5b

MALICIOUS

RTF

23.2 KB First seen: 2022-12-14

MD5: 15fd19d0d2edf279e15b6b5db500bc1c SHA-1: c3ad1bcf3d5d9e655eea412656048472670285f0 SHA-256: 6cc0b2aa248eca5b8fdfe7210cc0ad72406c24470a0532634411e8291d1f31ed

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate suggests the object is configured to activate automatically upon opening or enabling editing. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic for macro-based or exploit-laden documents.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000049d6.bin` `9d7516e772945cb8049d0c809f4bc34851509e016e7c996ea45dd86b1f6ec977`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x49D6	1581 bytes

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