Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6ca04d35704e21f6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.0 KB Created: 2020-09-04 17:19:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d772071d9f01b0623a5632a3f6cc775a SHA-1: d7a50ac09739ffb5b4d05cde4475ef32595a16c2 SHA-256: 6ca04d35704e21f66d8d776602584b2974354a6abc7eb7b7dd7d5ebb19027aa9
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a malicious redirector link and a large number of external PDF links, suggesting a link farm or redirection scheme. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be a lure for downloading an application. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the presence of a download button lure and a secret recovery prompt further support a phishing or scam attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/wix?keyword=kakaotalk+apk+for+blackberry
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/5fd5c1_15a57881b5864bb4a278117ecd03a430.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/1e11d0_0255a83bf606440b98abfe65c4610410.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/69695d_766848e065ce4acb811341a106c765cb.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_a644aabf54cd4891aee24555feb8c015.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_ca7214c10c1b47438db081708e9ff2ce.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_8d6d05ba13cc4be48b865d1ca7e988b5.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3802/3592/files/22243279297.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4571/6129/files/desivuxonogumuwazinebeg.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2382/6085/files/cipp_c_study_guide.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ea2c45_08d01871c8484f12a3486ce3ed359272.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/cc15ef_807c1dda1a394afca90cd7a86aa04017.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/35f767_22249245264c44d7abc3ee75478b7cf4.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/1cc777_a8eab4cd033d4bf5a39a8d4cbf5368aa.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000064f0.bin
12dffd1909dceb0ebf572421b38989e7d35ce07c5b2c7c1dc5eefc18afbc4074		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x64F0 5104 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000766c.bin
ba57fb598d8c050d2645a027e06e190d41d2a2bb673456a04f68d26cebd384cb		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x766C 10344 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000099f7.bin
ea75db71c9df7250347a03039f742fcd189f5fc3f08964e696816fa8b5227073		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x99F7 16092 bytes

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