Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6c99a4bb87010b2b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.8 KB Created: 2020-11-09 09:54:25 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: eb8dc304030e9bda359730f12fc590c9 SHA-1: 0c4a652a822e90c24bed9dec82bd586c2deec490 SHA-256: 6c99a4bb87010b2b15ec38f658acef8708dc90bd5e62a7f2b4614db208cf3674
186 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure critical SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: action link to abused redirector https://zunesevofulopu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134385883/pemuguf.pdf.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffi.ru/123?keyword=types+of+circuits+and+ohm+s+law+answers PDF link annotation
    • https://zunesevofulopu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134385883/pemuguf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dejolezeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815968/4413828.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zoxuzuxebexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969059/93049f265a0000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369173/normal_5f9c8a59da728.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370541/normal_5f88939a2d3a1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417818/normal_5f9ef3d2081f9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://worufufiboverem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134391721/delakoturusazad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387806/normal_5f9da64d7e6d4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8e116cfe-c2bf-49e4-85c5-2d93141a4ac6/53672411015.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pulagip.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/ejercicios_de_sucesiones_numericas_para_preparatoria.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xadifipope.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/defensive_driving_course_alberta_ans.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0d444f27-bfdc-47a1-83f4-e70dacfc577c/sirovepizodosefatexe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dejubanev.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/70554114610.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007727.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7727 5540 bytes
SHA-256: 253428ed3045ff10f171ee04878530e77693b636d83b7a7a5f02a821f182f0c3
font_01_sfnt_off000089ed.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x89ED 11280 bytes
SHA-256: d007da515017e989861367f3b426fd8c5717a995584def9726d78cb925b1ea1b
font_02_sfnt_off0000b061.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB061 16192 bytes
SHA-256: 74a35dcac671789a1952909c7064e8f0092ccf84988030a41650584fa1b75142

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.