Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6c4f22a8de0e93b0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.87 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-01
MD5: b116c62107f4363045958cf7f85b2fcd SHA-1: 007854a997e4113f3b8e0d92b663017836627e37 SHA-256: 6c4f22a8de0e93b04bd1dd6d17ed70732f4efcfce622b25038a9f9c17c7426be
274 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample contains an OLE object exploiting CVE-2017-11882, which is a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This object embeds a PDF file that contains a direct link to a payload. The PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques and points to an external URL that likely serves as a download source for additional malicious content. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the embedded PDF is the primary vector.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • https://mobile.mail.yahoo.com/apps/affiliateRouter?brandUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fparg.co/UZzB&appName=YMailNorrin&partner=2&locale=1&pageId=&clickRef=contact_card&region=na&annotation=&buckets=

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
60de9d73eac0e6ccdf8951f11c91734d63cf08b4cf711f1fee65b8d8ecab2718		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00123702/oLE10NAtIve 1712 bytes
stream_001_off00000960.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x960 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off000a5400.pdf
64e0cf675bddd87088d131a66527578edd27ff7b9728310e06d2df431ba67d3e		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xA5400 1284096 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
84af275eaa7084831646b442611a12a92d6cf251edfb4a16be58d49a8d7def12		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1956352 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006800.pdf
0ad1a6c2324aa60d0ab96eb7f1aec00ed3300c0cd028aeaaa9a3c74c6bfad0e2		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6800 1934336 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029400.pdf
8b5be72ad5dc2eeeb25c45152e035317b99229f2623b3b75246b0c139ac81084		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29400 1792000 bytes

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