Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6c4d4550fcb625d7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 6b3165f51536eeb08ef60f6fcef98845 SHA-1: 66a6de986e563267ea67e5e00f3443c304b1806c SHA-256: 6c4d4550fcb625d769eba52663210ef37d678d1dae08d6198e34f6cf45bc9c2a
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d3.bin
6cf23430694c6fa0a2bacc58ad0dc02b892e3fc34c459fa65f610a4007c4df18
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD3 1654 bytes