Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6c10eda000215d46…

MALICIOUS

PDF

31.3 KB Created: 2020-06-06 21:26:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 100f2bc17881dc3b2ef4dc57d86282a4 SHA-1: 72ab8489cd30ec41bfe9533821c82e4dedcf3295 SHA-256: 6c10eda000215d466c1ab59cb930cbe117af0baad14e926645f23dc2b6f5f407
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains a significant number of external links, as indicated by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic. These links point to various PDF files hosted on different domains, suggesting a link farm or a distribution mechanism for malicious content. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, making it difficult to determine a more specific attack pattern beyond the link farm.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://pflagnorwalk.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639412/130639412.html#the+surveying+handbook+pdf
    • http://74-123-78-36.mgwnet.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483508/befadejumozexa.pdf
    • http://cpanel.renewablerelics.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620249/netelujevojesi.pdf
    • http://southdfwrooofing.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130436140/pirez.pdf
    • http://thespecialneedsdirectory.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438473/4773780.pdf
    • http://re-imaginarium.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130291556/e629725750e2b0.pdf
    • http://borgit.net/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874180/1919724.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://subigeda.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/56825326274.pdf
    • https://gimanuzil.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xifoguwotabegejo.pdf
    • https://jexogix.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/19139745727.pdf
    • https://zonutubuw.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/38738537345.pdf
    • https://gasoxof.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/71386186244.pdf
    • https://kejaram.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/385941565.pdf
    • https://popuxokogoju.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/87151275379.pdf
    • https://zejamiwi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/kosadunawez.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004ff3.bin
93bb4ad1e2c79f8337c9741ea3bef23bfd2a3236f96dac6c3122a9a65185f22b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4FF3 9864 bytes

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