Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6bfed8b00620ecde…

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.3 KB
MD5: ce7b9ec6ab8093b19fb5825e8f5cbcfe SHA-1: 1d1699a5e77399d7cd7be917a13051f6c40a9896 SHA-256: 6bfed8b00620ecdeed021d8c7cf85dbe8ac8af989def8e7f099a981576733d64
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF sample contains critical heuristic firings indicating exploitation of CVE-2010-0188, a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA forms. This exploit is designed to achieve code execution, likely for the purpose of downloading and executing a secondary malicious payload. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of this PDF.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream low PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0041.bin
c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0xCF3 85 bytes
embedded_file_obj0042.bin
dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0xDA5 1029 bytes
embedded_file_obj0111.bin
1c026eab62dd9a59f4fc5f7694945881b6ec2de8831d79e51846a4ee3c60ffb1
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 111 at offset 0xFBF 59286 bytes
embedded_file_obj0044.bin
3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x1FC4 144 bytes
embedded_file_obj0045.bin
10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x2071 77 bytes