Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6bfdc2cd8834b0b7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

171.7 KB Created: 2021-01-05 12:07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 559bb64c454899a7dba7e386421cea54 SHA-1: c346ab08106dc5f30bb2972d3133bcb554f9a8a4 SHA-256: 6bfdc2cd8834b0b754fb0e27882423ac07d2847ef11163583c2acede0798104c
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains a heavily obfuscated VBA macro that executes via the Document_Open auto-exec function. This macro utilizes CreateObject to instantiate a FileSystemObject, which is then used to write obfuscated content to temporary files. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0' strongly suggests a downloader family, likely Emotet, which is known for its complex obfuscation and multi-stage download capabilities.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
5fd199a84582bf2c4248191e49df05fe3a9d17ab4a6f639ead9a581ea6be129f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10799 bytes

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