Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6badb98c9d9c7785…

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.5 KB
MD5: c8979198783e6e41d698dc75e3cc362d SHA-1: 03ebfca074063a00349e14e305e3408663e61b0a SHA-256: 6badb98c9d9c778544f8f052c15ecaa3a9c0b41d837754a53ecb489cce34f117
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains obfuscated JavaScript, indicated by PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. The presence of PDF_EVAL and PDF_FROMCHARCODE, along with the PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER firing, strongly suggests the JavaScript is designed to exploit a vulnerability. This exploit likely facilitates the execution of a second-stage payload, as indicated by the ML_NYX_PDF_MALICIOUS classification. No specific URLs or executable content were directly extracted, limiting the IOCs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.6854

Heuristics 6

  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_003_off0000049f.bin
4447bc3bf2370788a868beaf4e818cbde6061d04686c8a8695d700584551fe2b
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x49F 4794 bytes
objstm_0025_00.bin
becdaf4a2a11016ab8b4375a768e92ab05301ea9faf4dce58d782668d7d4900d
pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 25 0 obj (inflated) 428 bytes