Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b986bb2c26cdccb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.2 KB First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: a6c75c4c126c09daa4754fd4a2cef4b9 SHA-1: b621a41dc89071b52842cbb7238940c1805f5983 SHA-256: 6b986bb2c26cdccb14aff9fef1ce54dca05abc6a04d1ea7fdba2d4b78c426c42
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this object, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common method for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000032.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x32 1601 bytes
SHA-256: 467ff4dd47d515f51fcb84ed04e839b59c7b0d5c43e00f211d8ab55ae95a74ea