Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b8951bdb8039b20…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

60.5 KB Created: 2018-02-21 00:56:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2018-06-14
MD5: f8581cda8606107b52e980984ca1545c SHA-1: 7c2913a4ef9c11f1d31789deb1b19f3363a5c36a SHA-256: 6b8951bdb8039b20cccdd3b70c6d69f619bcf2dbbc0947e331d70ecd79a6aa83
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an OOXML document that contains an embedded OLE object pointing to an external URL, identified as a CVE-2017-8759 exploitation attempt. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload, such as shellcode found within the extracted EMF artifact.

Heuristics 4

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://b.reich.io/ekihkm.doc In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 401396 bytes
SHA-256: 21d01a6bfe8e0af4fde26198451455c29c3b9fe0814e841534ce5ecc8b8398e7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: heap spray 0x0C

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