Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b5efff1ac5cba00…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

580.0 KB
MD5: a42b7370e683c3743c63d391acd2d603 SHA-1: f6198548c4c3d3182ea86757df1c98f81483d663 SHA-256: 6b5efff1ac5cba004488cdff02b531cb78e9f6b6f0cf55d0e02097ae5e5b3afe
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document that contains an Equation Editor OLE object. This object is a known carrier for exploits, specifically targeting vulnerabilities within the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution. No further details on the payload or specific exploit could be extracted due to encryption.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.