Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b4ba4d3bce57d66…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.1 KB Created: 2020-06-12 04:13:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8cd7ddb2d9c552df35214f2bebf3f60d SHA-1: 80f498908eb5fc64e24226741e777443da4b4649 SHA-256: 6b4ba4d3bce57d666963e8b0638b29923b91801bf01d9af116835ed44688a564
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links to other PDF files hosted on various domains, identified as a 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' heuristic. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The embedded URLs suggest a link-farming or content-distribution scheme, potentially to distribute malware or engage in SEO spam. No scripts were extracted, but the structure and heuristics point to a malicious intent to redirect users to external resources.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kzju.alikirsch.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130289277/130289277.html#world+of+the+cell+becker+pdf
    • http://dxme.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383889/58258eec.pdf
    • http://amaidensfare.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775501/9686781.pdf
    • http://addglittersinlife.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739026/milasora-mowasaka-xuman.pdf
    • http://rapidpermitreviewhawaii.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069961/5226434.pdf
    • http://mountainmascot.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130550825/pazivixubuxut.pdf
    • http://thearcvc.vip/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383609/sekowudaz.pdf
    • http://luv4puppies.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130550838/tokafetizasiref.pdf
    • http://profipriorities.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452815/68bdca12ad.pdf
    • http://charlesleblanccareerservices.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130436050/fef5261bdc150.pdf
    • http://macrotopia.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398182/5429502.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://rolinozopuj.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/mifopabimutupefipulef.pdf
    • https://pefeledegabo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/13304575944.pdf
    • https://pupevifuraro.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/51912814350.pdf
    • https://nulogep.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/57117687548.pdf
    • https://venazuburam.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vakirezeju.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005ab5.bin
b7611a653c393b866bee37344f3a5dda2508c6a1be8eec8cea52501e9404e07f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5AB5 10752 bytes