Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b46d1483708ec60…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

716.0 KB Created: 2007-03-02 00:18:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: 1faeda863a7c311b60165080bdc6d922 SHA-1: 81b5662165fbbfd7dfb6fc6fe52294290db82ce9 SHA-256: 6b46d1483708ec603e89735902d4a9b0e0020b894f22c58538df30e0cdc8664e
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OLE document with a significant slack space anomaly and an embedded PE executable. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, suggesting the embedded executable is likely unpacked or executed. The document body appears to be benign educational content, but the embedded executable is the primary indicator of malicious intent. The presence of an embedded executable strongly suggests a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 7

  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 733,184 bytes but its declared streams total only 416,829 bytes — 316,355 bytes (43%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.installshield.com In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_00068000.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x68000 307200 bytes
SHA-256: 0b8dc55bb2dfcf96f9c0132efd81e84f692417e1aa73fd78c0f85fae35821888