Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b416edf647a87fb…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

9.4 KB
MD5: abd8c9fa44868ea4f379c9ad707e25f2 SHA-1: f0b92591bd134141aba388d07b1947e7fcc685c7 SHA-256: 6b416edf647a87fb7c57ffa5250446d8639ca5a48490ccb4f12a47dd4a3d5049
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Equation Editor. High-confidence heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882, a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor, which allows for arbitrary code execution. This technique is commonly used to deliver secondary payloads, hence the likely attack pattern.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000123d.bin
51b4d8245a4fb462de6070e8cbf2b479361184c92b58bcc4bb45bdc8d363f277
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x123D 1581 bytes