Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b3ab83d3ce01f27…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.0 KB Created: 2020-10-02 13:22:48 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-07
MD5: 0e846fae7bc952791a217a00991883b4 SHA-1: 1824d191ad47938808cf55a93e64444d8e19d306 SHA-256: 6b3ab83d3ce01f27d0ede608619a922b816753671dd2d741b2545ae6f88d8786
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and ultimately lead to a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the link farm structure suggests an attempt to distribute malicious content or phishing lures. No scripts were extracted, but the primary attack pattern involves directing users to external malicious URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=sybil+flora+rheta+schreiber+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://vesel.fleenorfamilyadventure.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437299/5922759.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mrhaughaboo.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383743/9477547.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.briandeon.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874416/vuzorif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://merolo.camptesahe.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696067/b8b9c90.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039496.mozfiles.com/files/1039496/lokazefirajixuvoxuzanif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038506.mozfiles.com/files/1038506/senazepigelapevijufuti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036627.mozfiles.com/files/1036627/xepixusevo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036902.mozfiles.com/files/1036902/dofubuli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.gvscleaning.co.uk/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682737/tomimezewagov-gugixidiparogu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.crengtech.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776055/suwalitamisot_ferunodos_fowixolag_warapimolazu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.investwithsmdc.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873848/9758403.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.manygendersonevoice.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454305/1803793.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c81040f5-92ba-4e8b-82b7-c1d857de255e/xilepafalabuguxon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/918ab684-8907-412c-8a57-c67e22cfa3b2/48602844857.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/019048cd-0619-4f8b-b557-4f190957710f/wafosalivuxavusilag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ec707b86-86c9-4251-98dc-0ed0d99dfc62/nebuzikuli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000065e3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x65E3 5588 bytes
SHA-256: f1b9e96c5e2ae3b25ca573d305bc1fffeebf9dc65672f2720623e9ff4067346c
font_01_sfnt_off000078de.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x78DE 10008 bytes
SHA-256: 4ae5e393a10ec05f4bc0f6d9882f872ec32f287dc29e20a63eb768d76ea942a2