Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b284863c079141f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

155.3 KB Created: 2021-01-04 18:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 33862f88b0095da427166aa809f7d12d SHA-1: 6e5bd00ef4856bd9312eae6551cd6ddc896994ae SHA-256: 6b284863c079141fa6e5caab9fd9228eb0503d2790fadc82360b8e3fcb2de684
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains VBA macros that are triggered by the Document_Open event. These macros utilize obfuscated calls to CreateObject to instantiate the Scripting.FileSystemObject. The script then proceeds to create and write arbitrary content to files on the file system, such as 'X:\ZfjaGxEE\FKCRoAp.GoRlEtL', indicating an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
28e0aab9def1820176582f12126397a14f2c858209766b704c735ce1d1db4cc2
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 7154 bytes