MALICIOUS
180
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1204.002 Malicious File
The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) for execution. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this known vulnerability. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic suggests that the embedded OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the execution of the exploit. No document body text or scripts were extracted, but the exploit itself is sufficient to classify the attack pattern.
Heuristics 5
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Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATEDRTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
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Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITORRTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00001e2a.bin2f62246769452a7e0279029953f1a0ca3b8f9ab60fe0782484a7e1dd0ddebc12 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E2A | 1876 bytes |
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