Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6afc1e0b771fae6a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

139.6 KB Created: 2021-02-07 17:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: cdd02bbdd280712428533e2157dd7874 SHA-1: 9d7883e6a23ce21bdaa40817800f6a24951a865c SHA-256: 6afc1e0b771fae6a367f5c7d611868eaa6ab201d34145105e8248fd25c6ef4f5
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a Microsoft Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro triggers a chain of events that ultimately uses CreateObject to download a file from the URL "http://elettrico.casa/footer.jpg" and save it as "C:\users\Public\wiku.jpg". This indicates a downloader functionality, common in malware delivery.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
99408ecaeede979e11da4ccc30f147a2c761900a0799b432eb361c6a024e9222		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2305 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
012b60f7acd976b8374d734d116e6be12ef60808ababffec18d41cb8f4b2c41a		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 98304 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.