Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6ac5e34d6c4e0218…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

16.1 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: 3216915af63fad5e69132a0db8e2e27d SHA-1: 8d107aa7320c20b1bbbceeb7c1ea34a9a20fdcda SHA-256: 6ac5e34d6c4e0218370b529e43e9548c8ecf5b7412a1cee5a2b8afecccb06c1e
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1218.010 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an Excel macro-enabled document that uses a "Protected view" lure to encourage users to enable content. Upon enabling, the VBA macro executes, leveraging CreateObject to call 'mshta' and download a payload from the URL 'https://www.bitly.com/asdasdasdiasddwdwkdaw'. This indicates a downloader or initial access stage for a more complex attack.

Heuristics 7

  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: xl/cooo.b)
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.bitly.com/asdasdasdiasddwdwkdaw

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e4bf9c18fd090c9fd7dcc58c7ce6eeaf54b859b9028687a00ca01758726225b0		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1620 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
4260f85f091926c4bfeb6391a22c904be3fe2bdb178e395814038caee02ccef9		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/cooo.b 22528 bytes

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