Emotet Office (OLE) / .DOCX malware analysis — malicious · 6aa8822f97a4b8c6

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

155.1 KB Created: 2021-01-04 18:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: 7d400a0886644ea8a6dcc90e1318c4b9 SHA-1: f739b5d182c53f0cd2d3c44cefa5d9d293dac4a0 SHA-256: 6aa8822f97a4b8c6f94cfea8ac81f0deffe57554498a897a22930d98366a5599

262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening the document, as indicated by the Document_Open heuristic. The macro uses CreateObject to instantiate a Scripting.FileSystemObject, which is then used to create multiple files on disk with arbitrary names and content. This behavior is characteristic of Emotet malware, which often uses macros to download and execute further stages.

Heuristics 7

Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION

VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `28e0aab9def1820176582f12126397a14f2c858209766b704c735ce1d1db4cc2`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	7154 bytes

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