Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6aa3c5b34da4f5be…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

327.5 KB Created: 2020-10-19 09:55:17
MD5: 06b0dd6666542b8542fff55e24163c0a SHA-1: fd2d41436d529f07ac7346df8f70a962c9ee3d9a SHA-256: 6aa3c5b34da4f5beab6341a6a3a289089a305c24f90c6504f6816467bed39143
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The Workbook_Open VBA macro is obfuscated and uses CreateObject to execute a PowerShell command. This command downloads a file from http://weeshoppi.com/wp-includes/ID3/g1/98880.jpg and saves it as C:\Users\Public\Documents\jaecyyv.exe, then executes it. This indicates a downloader or dropper functionality, typical of initial stages of a malware infection.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://weeshoppi.com/wp-includes/ID3/g1/98880.jpg

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1d752b551438f388b9049fa483d34cb69bc59f280ccb88917c7c92aa4f9f4552		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1776 bytes

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