Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a92fa20a3f6d6f2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

83.8 KB Created: 2018-11-05 17:18:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-01-31
MD5: c0d71c52ccc7d6a5353c98de917a9d5f SHA-1: f1906f46c903af30df53ab5b0b0d0dbc1842ab24 SHA-256: 6a92fa20a3f6d6f2d1f4d4e14ba64c79478470f7cd0b4b330f26ba43632dde7a
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The document contains a heavily obfuscated PowerShell command embedded within the document body. This command is designed to decompress and execute a Base64 encoded payload, likely a second-stage downloader. The presence of cmd.exe and PowerShell execution heuristics strongly suggests an attempt to download and run additional malicious content, characteristic of a macro-based downloader.

Heuristics 5

  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 85,760 bytes but its declared streams total only 48,118 bytes — 37,642 bytes (44%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

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