Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a91fa33ba98352d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.1 KB Created: 2020-10-26 10:19:03 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: 47e7ec7068a654cceaca6f815da91718 SHA-1: 3f8d0bd75403a9894bb184be4fe1df1653b9752b SHA-256: 6a91fa33ba98352dcbf8a572aad29d983c7fc7c5d26d85d5fdeebb2fcdefe6cd
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=whatsapp+apk+download+jio+phone+version In PDF document text
    • https://duxataravur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017775/nogijilimajoli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/nimemoroligamaj-tafixidupara.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nijubalalo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453980/4280872.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367007/normal_5f879f9de4806.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368976/normal_5f8e6ff95d514.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374708/normal_5f8a13bcee6ca.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370078/normal_5f93d513420d7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369332/normal_5f8ce0ac12cb0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366350/normal_5f88726104000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tegugozitofo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874592/337fb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://daletutanedura.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636587/698a6b376.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://muvisodujop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134358588/xegadevugaboj_purolirerilonu_vawozureniguwup_nederilemurabip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vevejeda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776099/265bdd54fd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006433.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006433.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0498/9508/0135/files/mitabenigunowupi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/6837/2632/files/jiramavasab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0502/4517/3413/files/89366222021.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jiguwuzobozobaz/adrianne_holt_regresa_a_mi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nitajosasa/free_weight_training_programs.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zevutebulaworel/bikifekakudot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006433.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006433.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6433 5352 bytes
SHA-256: ee30704f650bb621b66b55866f897ab49faa22d902179c37b3e3f1e5bb3aab7a
font_01_sfnt_off0000767f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x767F 10856 bytes
SHA-256: ce33147cd13df7b063674d57ad16b4044a9e6aab69a62afb48295500f339768c