Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a82e653e90260ef…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

2.19 MB Created: 2022-08-11 18:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-12
MD5: a7c30594d9acfd76fd4f5f0ded7d3a5b SHA-1: 21567e35dbb5a5476ce8e1d433bb854400b1a6e2 SHA-256: 6a82e653e90260ef8d21be6d96e190fc9aa41d202c4b22403645a893db22d787
362 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing a VBA macro. The macro is designed to execute shellcode loaded from document properties, a technique often used by downloaders. The document body itself contains a lure to enable macros, claiming compatibility issues with older Office versions. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.af2f0393915c6ce8-OOXML-9981526-0' further supports its role as a downloader.

Heuristics 10

  • VBA property-stored shellcode loader critical OLE_VBA_PROPERTY_SHELLCODE_LOADER
    VBA auto-exec macro takes the address (VarPtr) of a byte buffer decoded from a document property, marks memory executable (VirtualProtect/VirtualAlloc), and transfers control through a callback API (e.g. SetTimer/EnumWindows). The payload is hidden in the document properties rather than the macro source — the SVCReady loader pattern, a native shellcode runner rather than a parser CVE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.af2f0393915c6ce8-OOXML-9981526-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.af2f0393915c6ce8-OOXML-9981526-0
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA reads reversed config from document properties high OLE_VBA_REVERSED_DOCPROP_CONFIG
    VBA applies StrReverse to values read from the document's custom/built-in properties. Storing reversed configuration (URLs, CLSIDs, env-var names, payload names) in document properties keeps indicators out of the macro source — an obfuscation technique used by the SVCReady loader.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: word/pjkedzqpCZ.bin)
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
4fecba25602abd4ca83b05af3729a29fc3f90ea53b604198c3aaf268850565fd		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 19400 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
50a5600c88b662a3fd9980402600b8831ac1d561f402ec33bb557fb3ef61a349		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/pjkedzqpCZ.bin 14848 bytes

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