RTF malware analysis — malicious · 6a72f2326fcab3ab

MALICIOUS

RTF

27.1 KB First seen: 2023-07-05

MD5: be855d4449d170c7783d5767d02491d7 SHA-1: 1a5ddddaa3d3f3d236877d4d1194035a69daa59b SHA-256: 6a72f2326fcab3ab7b75c0c1e659d29225a10f2753b115b9cbd00fe5dcf7edd1

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, and the \objupdate directive forces its activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers to bypass security measures. The presence of these elements strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000451e.bin` `706721a5bce388068b776acff4c8aff8373c98d9e04880d74c1a1834f5bb6dbe`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x451E	1660 bytes

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