Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a6facc88e849e96…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

986.0 KB Created: 2021-06-24 12:02:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: e4ab13fa68f2d873d85d0ef682d09f4a SHA-1: dc5251187e6ae5df2ce2cacfedef897f6f73a4e6 SHA-256: 6a6facc88e849e96e4b3804c2bc3eac424e3792358fc8467398955463b708a5b
682 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample contains VBA macros that execute upon opening the document, specifically the Document_Open macro. This macro attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload, identified as 'kikus.dll', by leveraging the ShellExecuteA API. An embedded PE executable ('embedded_office_0008ee71.exe') was also detected, which likely serves as part of the malicious payload or dropper mechanism.

Heuristics 18

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Win.Packed.Johnnie-10034316-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Packed.Johnnie-10034316-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet present medium OLE_XLM_AUTOOPEN
    Workbook contains an Excel 4.0 macro sheet sub-stream — XLM is rarely seen in modern legitimate workbooks and was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
ad427da8430d0bab4b976c0aa215ff17485db4f0e31aee29dd87b9d86837c45d		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2742 bytes
embedded_office_0008ee71.exe
418c188fba766317eaa13574fd54804154cfd76e616b2c080c7ab5f09dd3feb8		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8EE71 424335 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin
4c91f75e7c646f02a4e81780f886c821e4e2f07e1e8a72c19ca473cdc5e34b4c		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1686016279/Ole10Native 384309 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Johnnie-10034316-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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